The impact of European policies towards science and technology on the European research landscape by Backhaus, J.G.
  
 
The impact of European policies towards science and
technology on the European research landscape
Citation for published version (APA):
Backhaus, J. G. (1996). The impact of European policies towards science and technology on the
European research landscape. (METEOR research memorandum; No. 031). Maastricht: METEOR,
Maastricht University School of Business and Economics.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/1996
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
12 February 1996
THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN POLICIES
TOWARDS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON
THE EUROPEAN RESEARCH LANDSCAPE
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3Abstract
In this essay, I have tried to show that the European Union inititiatives towards science and
technology, ostensibly in the interest of promoting employment and growth through technolo-
gical advancement, have side effects that undermine the very purpose at which they aim. The
funding formula and the way the programs are launched undermine the ability of leading
research universities to be leading players in the international fields that is, of course, not
dominated by European Union research priorities. The only way to make the program succes-
sful is, indeed, to make it universal, which is out of the question. More specifically, we have
taken note of a number of points which are worth taking stock of at the end of this long essay.
They do not quite reveal the impact of the argument, but some preliminary statements may well
be formulated on the basis thereof.
4Zusammenfassung
Dieses Kapittel gilt der Politik der Europäischen Union im Hinblick auf Technologie und
Forschungsfragen. Die Fragestellung wird auf die traditionelle forschende europäische Univer-
sität eingegrenzt, die im deutschen Sprachraum mit dem Humboldtschen Ideal beschrieben
wird.
Es wird auf Grund eines ökonomischen Modelles gezeigt, daß diese Universität als System
zwar begreifbar, aber im Einzelnen schwer modellierbar ist. Ihre Effizienz roht in der umsichti-
gen Beobachtung von erwarteten Rollen, Prozeduren, Akten mit ihren Vorgängen und einem
bestimmten Comment wissenschaftlicher Arbeit, der die Publikation der Forschungsergebnisse
gewiß verlangt, aber nicht die Formen vorschreibt, in denen diese Publikation erfolgt.
Unter der Annahme, daß Universitäten vor allem (volkswirtschaftlich gesehen) öffentliche
Güter und Externalitäten produzieren, wird weiter der Frage nachgegangen, wie sich die
Politik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf die universitäre Landschaft in Europa auswirkt.
Idealtypisch wird an die traditionelle Humboldtsche Universität gedacht. In dem Aufsatz wird
im einzelnen ausgeführt, welche erheblichen Verschiebungen und zum Teil auch
Verwerfungen die europäische Politik bewerkstelligen kann, und es wird auch auf einige
Beispiele eingegangen, bei denen dies wahrscheinlich jetzt schon abzusehen ist.
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Sometimes, the research departments of commercial companies also compete with1
university research institutions, for instance for publication space and scholarly ho-
nors, such as the Nobel prizes.
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I. Introduction and Overview
European policies towards research in science and technology cover research carried out at
research based commercial companies, research based non-profit institutions and the traditional
research universities which also have a teaching mission. While the commercial research based
companies obviously compete among each other on commercial markets and while the not1
for-profit research institutions with specific research objectives tend to also internationally
compete with each other, for instance in processes of public tender offerings, the different
Member States of the European Union have developed and still maintain very different univer-
sity systems that communicate very little one with the other. For instance, professorial mobility
is very low between the different university systems, when it can be very high within a particu-
lar university system. For instance, the German language area can be said to have developed
one type of university system, with similar and comparable degrees, high professorial mobility
and common media of publication. The British system, on the other hand, certainly in the post-
Thatcher years has developed a very specific and own style and professorial mobility is strong-
est with the university landscapes of non-European Union Member States such as the United
States and Canada. The French maintain a largely separate system, and so do other Member
States of the European Union. Within each of these systems, there is competition for resour-
ces, but this competition can take on very different forms. When the European Union identifies
its policies towards research based institutions such as the research universities, they will
respond to the incentives developed through European Union policies in very different ways,
depending on their own structure, mission and the rules of their system within which they are
operating. These rules are typically embodied in complex legislation on university organization,
as most Member States of the European Union maintain a large state university system with
very few exceptions for private institutions. The missions even of the research universities in
the different Member States of the European Union tend not to be identical.
Each of these systems has developed its own forms of communication, its own forms of
competition and its own style of existence. As a common policy of the European Union now
adds to the traditional purposes, functions and styles of performance, friction can occur
between the intended objectives of the European policy initiatives and the traditional missions
of the research institutions to which these initiatives are being addressed. The purpose of this
chapter is to explore the possibility of such frictions, their likely cause and possible remedies.
The chapter starts by discussing the economic basis of the traditional European research
university (II). This leads to a discussion of forms of competition between scholars and institu-
tions. Competition can take on a certain form, and the concept of order in law, economics and
scholarship is introduced in order to discuss the different forms competitive processes among
research institutions and scholars can take. An important element of each order of scholarship
is communication, which is discussed in the following paragraph (V). Minimal functional
requisites for an order of scholarship are discussed (VI) in order to have a backdrop for an
A good institutional description of the policies with both a historical survey and a2
theoretical analysis can be found in Joachim Starbatty and Uwe Vetterlein,
Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik in der Europäischen Union, Tübingen: Wirt-
schaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 1994 (Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 39).
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overview over critical aspects of European policy goals (VII) and critical aspects of European
policy instruments (VIII). Ultimately, any science policy aims at improving the performance of
the institutions which it addresses. This is why performance and its evaluation is necessary to
be addressed in this context in order to understand how science policies such as the European
science policies work (IX). One of the aspects of European science policy is the internationali-
zation of scholarship and the opening of the different university systems; inevitably, in conjunc-
tion with the necessary evaluation of science policies, this involves the concept of rating the
different institutions thus affected (X). Rating, however, can have disastrous consequences, in
particular in the long run, which is why alternative approaches need to be considered (XI). The
chapter ends with some tentative conclusions (XII).
This chapter builds on a body of literature emphasizing the concept of an order underlying
economic processes. This literature, based on the work of Eucken and the Freiburg school, is
almost exclusively available in German. A secondary goal of this chapter is to make this
literature better available to an international audience by showing how it can be applied to a
core problem of European Union policy and how the results of the application of this body of
scholarship differ from the available literature.
II. The Economic Basis of the Traditional Research University
In the interest of strengthening the competitiveness of the European economies through
technological leadership and thereby also in the interest of growth and employment, the
European Union has increasingly become involved in the area of policies towards science and
technology. The basis for these policies can be found in the Treaty of Maastricht in article 130
(i,k), where scope and realm of such policy programs are being described in broad terms.
The changing scope, form and structure of financial and other incentives, the latent tension
between furthering co-operation in the interest of technological leadership on the one hand,
and the strengthening of the competitive order on the other shall not be addressed in this essay.
Here, we shall only take as an institutional given that the European Union through Council and
Commission is active in the field of policy in the area of science and technology (broadly
conceived): that the Union thereby addresses largely institutions that are either private or
public and not located at the level of the European Union: that the policy works through
programs that bundle specific particular interests in identifying research priorities: and that2
these policies offer financial incentives designed to change the behavior of the institutions, both
private and public, engaged in research and development.
With this very parsimonious set of assumptions in place, we can turn to a stepwise analysis of
the impact of European policies on the European research landscape, where the emphasis will
be on that part of the European research landscape in which public and not for profit organiza-
tions have historically operated and which they have dominated. The area of commercial
research and development, such as in the areas of air, space, atomic energy, other energy,
The university of Marburg (Lahn) is such an example.3
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pharmaceutical research etc. is certainly important but not the focus of this chapter. With
European research landscape we primarily mean research carried out in nationally and
internationally competing universities and similar institutions of research and higher learning.
The traditional research university is the second term, introduced in the outline, that requires
further precision. Ever since the first universities were founded in Europe in Salerno (1050),
Bologna (1119), Paris (1150) and two centuries later in Germany, Prague (1348), Vienna
(1365) and Heidelberg (1386), several dominant characteristics can be emphasized which do
not describe any single one institution at every point in time since its inception until now, but
can be held to describe the European research university as an ideal type (Max Weber). Sancti-
oned by papal, imperial or later other state decrees and charters, the traditional European
research university is a community of scholars and students jointly enjoying a high degree of
autonomy (originally their own citizenship and jurisdiction) in the interest of preserving the
traditional academic freedoms and allowing the universities to govern themselves, as their
specific mission often put them at variance with the modus operandi of the immediate environ-
ment. The product of the university consists in the instruction and grooming of future scholars
who will help in preserving traditional knowledge and improving upon it by means of research
and learning. The process requires a high degree of self-regulation, as this is the main form of
quality control. Internally, the functional distinctions in the traditional research universities are
based on the one hand on the relative advancement in scholarship, as both students and te-
achers in their various stages of progress jointly form part of the body (therefore called)
university. Secondly, the traditional form of organization emphasizes the different areas of
specialization originally organized in the different faculties. It is symptomatic for the operation
of a traditional research university that its decisionmaking is organized in terms of these
faculties or areas of specialization, which means that the endowment with resources different
researchers enjoy depends both on their status within their discipline and the status of the
discipline within their university. The latter is typically path dependent.
As the output of the university consists in very few tangibles and mainly in public goods and
externalities, it is difficult to measure; and for that reason performance evaluation tends to be
input oriented rather than output oriented. The input is then typically measured in terms of time
and the fulfilment of specific requirements, in the case of education the sequence of examinati-
ons, in the case of instruction frequence, length and timing of lectures and other forms of
education, in the case of research the passage of certain tests and procedures of quality certifi-
cation, such as public defenses, requirements to publish research results, competitions for
specific prizes announcing problems to be solved etc. These forms have during the last century
become much more variegated and also almost routinely being employed, a process and some
features thereof are discussed in more detail in sections 9 and 10.
Since so much of the emphasis on performance measurement had traditionally to be put on
inputs and the meeting of certain formal criteria, the revenues of the university would also be
related to rough input measures such as student enrollment, granting of degrees, certain
academic events etc. with a heavy reliance on fees (for immatriculation, for lectures, for
degrees) and independent forms of revenues. In particular, those universities founded in
Germany after the Reformation were often given substantial endowments taken from de-
constituted church institutions.3
Most German universities founded after 1648 clearly fall into this category.4
In the United States, even small colleges sometimes boast impressive endowments.5
Berry College in Rome, Georgia founded by Martha Berry at Mount Berry in 1902,
with a student body of barely 1,000 enjoys an endowment well in excess of
100,000,000 dollars. In addition to receiving undergraduate and graduate education,
students also receive vocational training in one of the various college related enterpri-
ses, some of which have been able to launch innovative products nationwide. The case
points to the viability of well endowed institutions of higher learning without state
support.
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Similarly, the large wave of university foundations according to the Land-Grant Act (1862;
1890) in the United States more than a century ago endowed the universities with (typically
undeveloped) land in order to fulfil their (in the United States three) missions of education,
research and extension.
This form of funding points to an aspect which has always been at the heart of university
related economics, and which also plays a role in the current European Union policies towards
science and technology. The public goods and externalities produced by universities,
although not directly marketable, are nevertheless very valuable, which is the reason why
universities were often founded as part of an economic development strategy. Some of these4
externalities can be captured indirectly, if the university is endowed with assets upon which its
production has a positive (external) impact. The function of extension work (essentially
amounting to developing agriculture, industry and trade in the area around the university)
provides an example for such an impact. The more successful the land-grant university has
been at this extension, the more valuable the land it owns and the higher the revenue it can
derive therefrom.
Most European research universities at present do not have significant own endowments. In
this sense, they contrast significantly with many American institutions. Consequently, most5
European universities depend on budgettary allocations that were until recently largely depen-
dent on the general fiscal situation of the state in question and input related criteria relating to
the specific university, such as enrollment, staff, specific on campus institutions etc. With the
increasing use of different funding formulae such as those used in the European programs,
increasingly reliance on matching funds and attempts at designing performance related budgets,
the traditional research university may experience tensions and challenges that question some
of the basic characteristics outlined in this section.
Although universities, and we shall further assume that they roughly fit the stylized institution
of the traditional European research university, do not directly compete in the market place as
they are resigned to producing essentially public goods and externalities, they are nevertheless
and always have been very competitive both in terms of universities competing one with the
other and in terms of internally providing for a competitive environment among the students
and scholars of which they are composed. These types of competition, however, tend to have
very different forms and features from what is typical outside the traditional academic environ-
ment. Outside the traditional university environment, probably the most important forms of
competition are price competition and product competition, essentially that type of competition
It is noteworthy that they would certainly not assign students to the different institu-6
tions of higher learning, as modern governments do, but rather moderate excesses of
disparaging each others reputation by issuing decrees in which they emphasized
positive aspects of their various institutions.
Other professions that also primarily provide public goods and externalities have7
developed strikingly similar procedures to those described here for the (ideal type)
European research university. For Spanish notaries public see Benito Arruñada, The
Economics of Notaries, European Journal of Law and Economics 3, (March) 1996,
pp. 5-37.
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through product innovation and the distinguishing characteristics of new or different products
from those of the competitor. Inside the university and between the universities, competition
has always taken on very different forms. Competition for students has sometimes been fierce,
even so fierce that for instance the electors and later kings in/of Prussia had to take measures
to regulate competition between their various state universities.6
In competing for students, universities found themselves in agreement with the leaders of their
respective host cities, who would profit from the presence of students due to increased indus-
try and trade. The different teachers at the university, however, typically also competed for
students among each other, although in this context competition by definition always had to be
among the few, since there would only be very few professors teaching the same subject
matter. That is why this form of competition could likewise become acrimonious and has
always been regulated by university bodies to some extent.
As long as we have known the institution of the university, teachers there have drawn largely
different (net) incomes. These are not only income differences as between the different univer-
sities, but also income differences between the different faculties in the university and furtheron
income differences within the same faculty, even if rates were the same. This has to do with the
fact that there have always been different sources of income not only for the universities
themselves, but also for their members. For instance, the traditional German university of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century emphasized lecture fees and sales from books as the main
form of income often well in excess of professors salaries. Hence, the successful university
professor would devote most of his attention to preparing lectures and keeping his one or
several textbooks in print. Consequently, research would be transported through the textbooks,
which then had the dual purpose of preserving and keeping the existing knowledge available
and adding new insight. With the advance of the technical sciences to the university research
landscape during the nineteenth century on the European continent and somewhat later in
Britain, revenues from new inventions and developments, patents etc. became increasingly
important, but remained special features of the technical universities or the technical faculties
where those existed in the traditional universities. Where marketable services could be combi-
ned with the university mission, such as in the new technical sciences, in chemistry or in
medicine, dual appointments of professors to university chairs and as directors to institutes in
their fields, with the institutes or hospitals generating fees for services, became increasingly
more important, notably during the late nineteenth and during the twentieth century. In all
these cases, the competition for resources always took the form of highly regulated processes
of quality certification and distinction.7
In trying to enhance its reputation, the university or the faculty in the university would empha-
size signs of quality and excellence through procedural means. As an example, in order to
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distinguish the law school in Göttingen and the medical faculty in Berlin, the Prussian universi-
ty administration (at the behest of Althoff) issued a decree requiring enhanced PhD require-
ments consisting of oral examination and the obligation to print the dissertation (implying that
there had to be one) which temporarily lead to the odd situation that two thirds of all doctoral
candidates in law concentrated at the non-Prussian universities of Leipzig, Heidelberg and
Jena. The medical students showed a similar reaction. Yet, in due course, all the faculties and
universities had to follow suit and insist on similar requirements of publicity, as they had to
compete through their perceived reputation. This is only one instance of an entire history of
similar regulatory and procedural refinements all intended to emphasize fairness in competition
when the quality of output is difficult to measure. Next to the publication of doctoral dissertati-
ons and public examinations throughout, open competition for university positions and the
prohibition of inhouse promotions (which are known to lead to nepotism) form part of this
heritage of reputation preservation. It should be emphasized that in no known case was there
an emphasis on trying to organize the competitive process around particular topics of inquiry
of themes of research, as such an attempt would necessarily skew competition in terms of
specific prior advantages.
Two aspects of European initiatives vis à vis the traditional research university are relevant in
this context. The European initiatives try to indeed identify particular topics and very often
also prescribe research methodologies. In this way, the field of competition is often reduced to
very few possible entries. This has the obvious short term effect of providing a wind fall
advantage to the researchers thus privileged. This intended short term effect, however, is
bought at a very substantial long term price.
Similarly, in an apparent attempt at stimulating innovation in the European universities, the so-
called Monnet professorships have been set up in such a way that they typically require inhouse
promotion and limited publicity for the competitive process. The procedure flies in the face of
traditional university appointment rules, and, again, next to the intended effects of benefiting a
particular group, has the potential of long term negative consequences as appointment rules
form part of the institutional capital the traditional research university has developed in order
to safeguard and protect its reputation.
IV.
The last two examples have been introduced here primarily in order to raise the issue of
whether in the interest of achieving a particular result (such as an emphasis on particular
research areas or the rejuvenation of a generation of the professorate of universities considered
by some criterion as too old) the European Union through its program initiatives may be well
advised and in her right or whether these policies may carry with them hidden costs that would
make them a subject of criticism and conceivably rejection.
Since on the face of it, the policies typically require some type of consensus of the implemen-
ting Member State, they should not be found to impose costs other than those weighed against
the benefits prior to their implementation. This view is the standard view not only held in most
quarters in Brussels, but also in the capitals of Member States, in the capitals of federal states
where these are responsible for university policies, and last but not least in the administrations
of many universities. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that neither are most of the
See e.g. Wernhardt Möschel, Corporation Policy from an ORDO Point of View.8
Chapter 7 in: Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (eds.) German Neo-Liberals and the
Social Market Economy, New York: Saint Martins, 1989, pp. 142-178 (154-155).
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customs that govern academic behaviour nor the procedures and traditions by which a univer-
sity attains its goals very well understood from a functional point of view. The university is an
institution that in Europe embodies the experience of almost a millenium, a period of time
which transscends most peoples imagination. During this time, enormeous revolutions in
culture, thought, experience and aspirations of European people have taken place, many
institutions have been shaken to their foundation or even long-disappeared, yet the university
with its peculiar rules and procedures has prevailed in the midst of very different environments
and faced by many different challenges. When in a particular country its structure had been
temporarily de-naturated, such as in pre-World War II Germany or in the countries of the
former state socialist regimes based on Marxism/Leninism, old university structures have been
revived and re-built upon, as if no other alternatives had ever existed. Probably, this is best
interpreted in terms of Hayeks approach to economic policy. When economic policies have
widespread and often unintended consequences, we should not pretend foresight but rather
plead ignorance and avoid breaking up structures the functions of which we poorly understand.
In this general sense, it is probably a safe rule of policy to only use such policy instruments
which exhibit a good functional fit with the institutions to which they are addressed. This is still
a very modest suggestion, but it can be augmented upon. In its more sophisticated appearance,
the approach referred to here is the so-called ORDO school of analysing economic systems
comparatively, the university landscape being such a system. By taking a systems approach,
the school was able to derive a set of necessary conditions for a competitive order originally in
the context of the market economy, but in principle generalizable to any kind of competitive
order. These conditions taken together as a whole form the framework for the competitive
order, i.e. the constitution of the system, and the operation of the system is greatly facilitated if
the conditions can be found among the constituting elements by which the system abides.
For the economic system of the market economy, these basic constituting elements have been
identified as 1. freedom of contract: 2. guaranty of private property: 3. the synchronization of
control and liability: 4. constancy and predictability of economic policy: 5. the provision of a
stable currency and 6. open access to markets.8
In the interest of space, I should not like to develop the intricacies of this theoretical approach
as far as the economic system goes. In this context, we are primarily interested in conditions
that can govern competition in progress in the university landscape of research institutions,
which, as we have seen above, have to follow somewhat different rules from those observed in
the corporate world, as they are primarily engaged in the production of public goods and
externalities and cannot engage in market exchange: in fact, for some time now in Europe,
these institutions have been state sponsored and it may therefore seem surprising that the same
theory of a market order should also apply to the landscape of research institutions.
In fact, it is not difficult to translate the six criteria into the relevant constituting elements that
have to govern a university landscape, and this is why I should like to sketch a short approxi-
mation in what follows.
In the market economy, freedom of contract governs the way exchange can take place. It is
primarily the notion of free choice of exchanging partners, the freedom of choice over what is
Different considerations apply when applied research is being carried out.9
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to be exchanged, the conditions under which the exchange takes place, the terms of the ex-
change relationship and their duration, the issue of whether or not to enter into a long term
exchange relation, and which aspects to exchange and which to withhold.
For the exchange (of ideas) between scholars, all these aspects have relevance. In scholarly
exchange, the consideration of the good offered is in fact just this: the consideration. An idea is
being offered, and taking it up either to reject or to further build on it and acknowledge it by
citation provides for a completion of the exchange.
Since most ideas published remain unconsidered, unacknowledged and often unread, finding an
audience for the scholar is as important as arriving at the idea or concept governing her inqui-
ry, in the purely functional sense of effective communication. Accordingly, the choice of the
form in which an idea is to be presented, be it as a book, an article, an experiment, a demon-
stration etc. is intrinscally tied into the choice as to what to research. Research design and
publication strategy are two aspects of the same activity, and in the traditional university
dominated research landscape they have been part of the freedom of doing research (academic
freedoms) in order to safeguard the effective flow of communication. It will appear later that
the European Union policies towards science and technology impact on this basic set of
freedoms.
The guarantee of private property in the market place does not imply that there be only private
forms of property and no forms of collective property. Of course, the university research
landscape is dominated by collective forms of property, and so care has to be taken with the
definition of this constituent element. In the context of market exchange, the guarantee of
private property rights implies that for each resource there be a one to one relationship
between the resource and a right pertaining to it. Rights may, of course, be jointly exercised
but in this case a clear decision rule has to govern the distribution of fruits from the co-exercise
and the allocation of consequences, i.e. liability.
In the case of the exchange of ideas in the university basic research landscape, collective9
property rights translate into private claims primarily when it comes to access to common
property resources. Such common property resources include: the stock of knowledge availa-
ble, the stock and flow of data available, access to research relevant papers and findings,
decisions, cases, policy documents etc., rights to offer ones findings and make them part of
the common domain, and as ancillary rights rights to exchange ideas, rights to travel, carry a
passport and library card, rights of computer network usage, etc.
Only if the participating scholars and scholarly institutions are roughly endowed with the same
bundle of rights can an unstrategic process of scholarly communication take place and continu-
e.
Synchronization of control and liability requires that those who are responsible for taking
decisions also be those who face the consequences. In the market context, this constitutes the
principle of liability. In the research university landscape, such an institute of liability has not
yet developed. It is not clear whether it can develop, because the process of scientific exchange
and discovery requires a certain amount of error in order to be productive. It is through the
launching of conceivably erroneous statements and their (backing) reputation that progress is
being made in scholarly pursuit. For that reason, liability in this context has been limited to the
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case of being proven wrong, which has always carried (negative) sanctions for the scholar or
group of scholars who have commited the error and conceivably also for the institution of
which they are a part. Beyond this, there is no liability for errors, as the benefits from correct
insight are also limited. They are in the public domain. The whole enterprise of scientific
communication and discovery is a co-operative and to that extent collective one, and therefore
individualized sanctions have to be limited in order not to bring the entire system to a grinding
halt.
Yet, a fairly recent development has occurred in that a large part of the daily decisions that
used to be made by scholars are now routinely made by university administrators who are not
responsible for the scholarly consequences of their action or non-action.
This phenomenon started less than a hundred years ago, and it is directly relevant to the issue
at hand, since the European Community routinely works through the university administration
and not with scholars individually or collectively: this is not surprising, since the European
Community is a bureaucracy itself, and not a scholarly enterprise. These joint decisions and the
consequences thereof, however, can lead to a serious impairment and conceivably a breakdown
of the scholarly community, the reliability of interchange and the unquestionability of scholarly
motives in entering into scholarly communication.
Constancy and consistancy of economic policy vis á vis the market has its immediate counter-
part in the requirement that policies towards university research landcapes be constant and
consistent as well. The reason here is straightforward and absolutely similar to the case of
market exchange. Constancy and consistancy in economic policy is a necessary element of the
social system or order for expectations of the future to be as accurate as market vicisitutes may
permit. These expectations drive investment decisions. The more investment intensive a
particular industry, the more vulnurable it will be with respect to changes in economic policy.
In the market economy, agriculture and the construction industry are cases in point. In agricul-
ture to this very day, there are investment decisions which have to be taken, by their very
nature, sometimes over several generations. The diversions between long term and short term
marginal costs in that sector can be immense, which means that the next generation may suffer
in its ability to carry on the farm business if a previous generation has committed a serious
error and locked it into an operation with low marginal and high average costs. Similarly,
construction and ship building, not to speak of forestry require constancy in economic data in
order to be carried on in a viable way.
The university research landscape is not different from those industries. Actually, in some ways
it is even more vulnerable to political vicissitudes without immediately showing signs of crisis
when entring a critical indication.
The reverse is also true. Due to the same benefit/cost configuration, universities hold out
political rewards in terms of employment and economic growth for quite some time (at least 6-
12 years) when the political benefacters have long left the scene. As a political trough of
agrital, universities are for the very long vere.
Mistakes made in one generation often haunt three generations later and benefits from prudent
decisions may not be visible during the generation when the prudent decisions have actually
been made. A lot of the capital of university institutions is locked into past decisions, procedu-
res, collections, research designs and personel policy. Adopting a research program is a
strategic choice for a young scholar, and she may be married to that research paradigm
longer than she is to her husband. After all, divorce implies writing down ones human
capital to nothing or next to nothing, and such decisions are not easily taken. Neither individu-
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als nor entire institutions can readily get away with making serious mistakes. Mistakes may not
be avoidable if the environment in which decisions have to be taken is constantly changing.
Hence, constant changes in policies towards research universities and those policies that
otherwise impact on the landscape in which research universities operate, are likely to have
very long term consequences which are very difficult to document in the short term when these
decisions are being taken. Still, the overall impact can be very big.
The provision of a stable currency is not, even in economic terms, the requirement to provide a
single currency for any particular market. In the European context, the reasons for wishing to
establish a single European currency are purely political and have no grounding in which ever
economic theory. On a general plane, the requirement calls for a single unit of account, when
there may be a multiplicity of units of exchange all being commensurate in that one unit of
account.
Generalization of this constituent element requires the insight that what is a currency for
market exchange actually, and speaking more generally, is the language in whichever market
communication takes place. Here, it is perfectly possible that market traders express their bids
in different languages (i.e. currencies) and yet transactions can be readily concluded, if there is
a common unit of account into which these different bids can be translated. Right now, as far
as money is concerned, any credit card company serving customers in different countries does
the same on a routine basis.
Obviously, research communication, which we have already identified as an exchange
relationship in that ideas and concepts are being offered and considered for either further use,
corroboration or rejection, require media of exchange. These media of communication, again,
have to be compatible in a way that is similar to the monetary requirement for a common
market area. There has to be one common unit of account, which makes the different commu-
nications commensurable.
In the context of scholarly exchange, this issue is rendered much more difficult than in the
context of a European Monetary Union. What needs to be made commensurable is being
expressed both in terms of language (such as an official languages accredited with the Europe-
an Union) and other forms of effective communication, including mathematics, computer
languages, but also languages that are not susceptible to any formal accredition procedure. As
in scholarly communities there is a division of labour, there are also economies of scale in
developing common concepts and common linguistic vehicles for smaller communities of
scholars working in the same area or on the same subject matter or with the same set of ideas,
data, etc.
In order to keep communication open, these scholarly networks need to be accessible for a
wider community of scholars, and they very often are not, because remaining closed may allow
for a competitive advantage in some funding process, as sometimes for purely linguistic
reasons a monopoly in some area (which has no translation) can be claimed. If this practice
takes hold, there is an incentive to break up the university research landscape and mold it into
different language areas so as to create a sufficient number of monopolies each being able to
claim particular preferantial treatment. This approach can only be undercut if no funding
agency is allowed to follow such particularistic practices, which implies that funding priorities
cannot be allowed to be put forward in terms of some specific language based paradigm or
lingo. All the European Union tenders for research grants applications I have received over the
last twenty four months were drafted as described here so as to grant preferential treatment to
Where method would be correct.10
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a very small group. They always described the research methodology in great detail so as to10
speak to a small group of scholars easily identified by insiders.
Finally, the principle of free access to markets can be readily translated into the European
university landscape, and with respect to European initiatives, there is little disagreement here.
The principle forms the core of the Treaty of Rome, and it has become increasingly obvious
that it needs to be translated into the market of ideas as well. This conviction also seems to lie
at the heart of the policies on the part of the European Union that this article deals with. The
issue is not one of principle; but one of the forms the policies take.
V.
The brief historical survey over the history of European research universities pointed to the
feature that even at the end of the nineteenth century, it was still very common that major
research results would be published in text books. As a matter of fact, it was still common
practice at Austrian universities until about the end of World War I that lectures would literaly
consist in the reading of stencils that had been pre-approved by censorship. The university
professor actually was not allowed to substantially depart from the pre-approved script, which
is why well healed students would hire poor but academically qualified fellow students to sit in
through the lecture and take the notes that were often required in order to receive the certifica-
tion of having heard the lecture. The benign features of this peculiar arrangement consisted in
providing heating and free education for destitute students who would otherwise not have been
able to pay for either heat or lecture fees and to provide the well healed students with the
opportunity to avoid the boring lectures, made boring by the imposing institution of censors-
hip, and pursue their carreers otherwise, in the fraternities and the salons.
The less benign features of this arrangement have been sufficiently detailed in the literature.
The description show that interference with the task of communication in the university, in this
case through the most likely least thought of measure of requiring pre-approval, can have
enormeous consequences. In this particular case, an entire future elite, being systematically
barred from effectively attending university lectures, was groomed in terms of main-
taining a distance to that institution of learning, and to take advice from other in all likelihood
less qualified sources. The most likely source were morels. The insight from this episode is
perfectly generalizable. When a university is no longer allowed to be its sole governing body
with respect to how lectures are being delivered, who is being admitted, who is allowed to give
the lectures at what time, what the lectures concern and how examinations are being handled,
in all these instances likely infringement of the free process of communication can be expected.
Only some of these infringements are benign. In the long run, the less benign ones will come to
the surface belatedly, because all parties involved have an incentive to deal with the short term
problems first and to delay handling the long term consequences of a particular intervention, as
these long term consequences most likely are not understood by a large group of decision
makers.
VI.
The foregoing display of historical features and vicissitudes in university development has not
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been a systematic account of the development of university based scholarly exchange of ideas.
There is no such a work, and my own exposition has drawn widely on a very large number of
published and sometimes unpublished sources. Yet, it is not impossible to postulate a minimal
canon of requirements for an effective order of scholarship, if we simply rely on our six consti-
tuent elements taken from ORDO theory and apply them accordingly.
1. Contractural freedom for the university landscape then must imply
a) for the relationship between student and university: free contractual choice: that means that
both the student and the university can either chose or reject the partner trying to contract. A
compulsory requirement to accept any student without an entry exam is certainly an infring-
ement of academic freedom as traditionally understood. Traditional universities have used a
combination of entry fees and rites of induction.
b) With respect to scholarship and the partners of exchange of ideas again, free contractural
freedom has to prevail, which implies that side payments influencing the behaviour of individu-
als, in particular groups or organs not directly related to the decisions with respect to research
and instruction should not be acceptable. If they were, freedom of research and instruction on
the part of the individual researcher or group of researchers would become difficult to live, as
free riders would use generous side payments and, undercutting normal channels of communi-
cation, would thrive on the published results made possible through the side payments. In this
context, it should be kept in mind that scholarly communication, as defined above, is a risky
business, the scholar always puts his or her reputation at risk. Results are offered for use,
corraboration or refutation. The subsidized scholar has no such concerns, as his client is not his
partner in exchange of ideas but rather the partner who underwrites the payroll of his penman.
Hence, the subsidized psuedo participant in scholarly exchange disturbs the basic order of that
exchange, acts as a free rider who cannot be sanctioned, as he has no stake in the proper
functioning of the collective enterprise.
The guarantee of private property rights in the context of minimal guarantees has to be seen as
an attempt to provide research universities with a means to recapture the benefits from public
goods and externalities they generate. Since the examples given for the United States and for
historical instances are not, so it seems, relevant today, we should be able to discern the
underlying principle and thereby arrive at new and feasible solutions. In the simplest of reaso-
nings, universities provide their students with enhanced human capital which is, consequently,
subject to taxation under the income tax.
Income taxes will be outside processes of European tax harmonization and therefore tax
instruments based on the individual income tax will still be possible as policy instruments in
order to provide for university financing. What can be done here is fairly straightforward. To
the extent that human capital is actually being provided by universities, student loans covering
tuition fees can be extended on the basis of successful university entry exams, provided these
entry exams have sufficient predictive value, and thereby the entire system of student loans and
state fellowships can be privatized. That would give even state sponsored universities substan-
tial room for re-learning the old game of competition.
With respect to research results, externalities and benefits from public goods are much less
readily captured. The standard solution of granting universities a solid portion of the budget
seems to be in question now, and a shaky stake in ever more questionable state budgets seems
to be of little value for research and growth oriented university institutions.
Something better than shaky portions in state budgets is urgently called for. Since universities
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provide mainly public goods and externalities, advising them to seek more revenue from
earning patents, royalties and the like is of little use. Internally, the engineers will cheer, but in
most other disciplines patents are marginal and copyrights are either irrelevant or even dys-
functional.
In the social sciences, copyrigths are dysfunctional because the scholar wants his research
findings to be made available to his colleagues and his students as readily as possible. Here, the
cost of consuming research in terms of opportunity costs (what could you have done with the
time you spent on trying to read this article?) are so exorbitant as compared to the conceivable
royalties, that adding the royalties would only hinder that scholars purpose. In these cases,
gaining financial independence from an ever less interested state patron, and knowing full well
that this patron will never endow its universities with the kinds of endowments that private
institutions on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean have received from private donors in the
past and still enjoy, will mean that remedies have to be offered that are only sensible in this
peculiar European predicament.
State legislatures that have ballooned state sponsored universities beyond proportion and into
tasks they were never made to fulfil, will now have to face what they have to face with every
other industrial development experiment: they will have to come up with a stabilization plan.
The stabilization plan, due to the distribution of voters in the case of universities will have to
be meager.
So it will not be in cash, but it can be in terms of tax facilities geared to these particular institu-
tions. What stuns every visitor of the United States and what stuns a careful reader of i.e.
German university history prior to World War I is the extensive willingness of a generous and
well healed public to give substantial funds to universities, even if these givings were subject to
charity taxes. Prior to World War I, there were a wealth of foundations in the German langua-
ge university landscape, supporting several universities outside the state budget. The peculiar
form of financing the effort of World War I on the part of the central powers wiped out the
material existence of these universities. These funds had been accumulated within a fairly short
period of time, under fairly adverse tax legislation. With enlightened or only a little bit enlighte-
ned tax legislation, it should be possible to repeat the accomplishment.
For procedure we should note the following. Since it is not difficult to show for almost any
university regulation that is state imposed how costly it is and how little benefit is derives, a
wonderful marketing field appears. A framework agreement has to be arrived at with the never
pleasable and always irritated state patron of universities to agree to a privatization action
where every private pledge for the foundation to guarantee the universitys existence will be
matched by the state. Then you take one regulation after the other that the state has imposed
opposed upon the university. It is by now a thick layer, which can be taken apart with an
archeologists care. For each of these a careful and sound cost benefit analysis is being prepa-
red. The compound net cost/benefit is put into the endowment fund, and if the state should
come out ahead, it is done to its credit. If it does not, getting rid of the regulation is marketed
into a tender to be fetched by the highest bidder able to provide a better suggestion for a
regulation, who will make an appropriate donation. The state has to match that donation.
Thereby, a prudent university administrator should have no trouble in building up a foundation
fund that will attract interest from people who have long sought to find a decent university
where to fund a chair, launch a research initiative and the like or else, which is on most pe-
oples minds, send their children (ore grandchildren). Again, the strictest rules will have to
apply to such donations, in order not to invite similarly awkward situations as the present ones
back again and through the back door.
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The point of this scenario is to show that it is possible to emancipate European research
universities from their increasingly unwilling state sponsors. Originally, the task of university
foundation was a state task only to the point of getting the university founded and established
with a charter. Intervening with university affairs is a fairly recent phenomenon, and we see it
mostly in those countries where universities were doing very well before the intervening. Now
that the rent has been reaped by politician who are by now long gone, it is time to get over
with this awkward experience and re-build the universities to their former image.
The nutshell of this story, which we want to put in the form of a minimum requirement, is this:
since a research university provides its output mostly in the form of public goods and externali-
ties, it has to be financed in a form that is relevant to this output. To the extent that tax finan-
ced solutions do not work, substitute arrangements making use of tax deductions for charities
and research may prove, based on precedent, to accomplish the task more effectively than
direct budgettary appropriations.
If increased independence from government budgets is going to be part of the future of Euro-
pean research universities, it will be extremely important to develop a code of professional
conduct for administrators that allows for distinguishing between the task of scholarly ex-
change of ideas, the production part of the company, and the task of securing funds, the
financial part of the company. In between, there is a third aspect, what in an awkward way
could be called the craftsmanship or commercial part of the traditional university, which is the
notion of carefully dealing with the clients, i.e. the students, the future employees, the seekers
of advanced degrees, and extension, this important aspect which has become the third wing
of the American land-grant universities. It is very difficult to make sensible statements on this
topic except for mentioning it. We have very few examples of good professional conduct of
university administrators that would shed light on the needs of the post-Maastricht period. It is
perhaps wiser in this context only to mention and to re-iterate that those who take decisions
have to be held responsible for their consequences in the long run, however, to the extent that
university administrators take decisions who may be appointed for just one or two years, while
those who may be held responsible for the decisions may be appointed for life, this arrang-
ements of affairs will in the long run leave the university as a collective institution with many
bad decisions for which nobody wants to be held accountable, and very few good ones, for
which there will be many claimants. Worse still, this approach will prompt many a scholar with
assets he deams to be highly appreciated in a context he can think of and his superior and
colleagues think little of in the context they can think of, to leave the institution and look for a
greener pasture. Although this may be the right course for many a departure, it may be very
costly to the sacrificing institution with respect to quite a few.
Understanding their patron has become a major problem of most state sponsored European
research institutions. Consistency, predictability and sometimes even honesty are wanted. Here,
the simple conclusion can only be that divestiture is the only conceivable course of action. A
state that does not take pride in its university institutions should get out of that activity right
away, because, among many reasons, it is a costly activity and it will not profit from an unwil-
ling patron. Different institutional settings can be readily imagined that are more conducive to
enlightened university life, which after all not always to everybodys pleasure reverberates on
social life in the community in which it operates. Yet, that is what pretty much everybody
expects from a university, and one should therefore be willing to find a form in which universi-
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ty activity can be conducted without constant and sometimes very costly interferences from
rather different bodies of government.
The more technical aspects of the next three criteria have already been extensively discussed
previously, and I shall therefore now turn to section seven.
VII.
The field of European policies towards science and technology and the impact of sometimes
other policies on the European research landscape is very difficult to evaluate in a comprehen-
sive way, as these policies are extremely diverse, and sometimes, so it seems, obtusively hidden
in policy documents that, of course, reflect the constitution of the European Union but are not
necessarily tailored to the needs of the scholars who are supposed to respond to European
Union initiatives. Since this chapter is devoted only to constitutional aspects of how to react to
those initiatives, given your particular university environment, and furthermore what you can
do about constitutionally changing your university environment so as to make it more suitable
and susceptible to such policy initiatives, it may be sufficient to single out only two characteris-
tics of European policy initiatives with respect to science and technology which go, indeed, to
the core of the traditional research university. These two are readily identified. It is on the one
hand the idea of matching funds, and it is on the other hand the notion of identifying core
areas, typically combined with the idea of matching funds. In order to explain what actually
happens, and in order to also illustrate the principle of subsidiarity which is here of immediate
concern, let me try an example. Before I do that, let me recall the principle of subsidiarity:
In areas which do not fall within the exclusive competence, the community shall take
action in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity only if and insofar as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states
and can therefore by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the community. (article III B (2)) of the EC Treaty.
Under a matching fund arrangement, let us assume that a university with an anthropology
program called A that is also joined with a biology program called B in one department recei-
ves a notice from the university administration, that matching funding is to be expected if the A
and B program could come up with a proposal that would allow the university to get matching
funding for a general program called human inquiry into our existence which would have to
involve at least three faculties. The university administration knows that is has a chance per-
haps one in seven to catch a grant that would allow it to fund its research activities through an
external source without compromising on the teaching activities. At the same time, that same
university administration knows that it has never reaped any tangible benefit from the research
activities of its faculty.
We noted earlier, that research universities are engaged in the production of public goods and
externalities, which means that no existing university administration has ever reaped any direct
benefits from any research activity ever conducted under its own auspices, other than by
chance. In the usual course of things, this proposal is going to travel downstream to the level
of the college. Lets keep in mind, the central university administration was willing to match
the funds. In all likelihood, the dean of the college is also interested in matching the funds and
See Mancur Olson, "Evaluating Performance in the Public Sector". In: Milton Moss,11
ed., The Measurement of Economic and Social Performance, Studies in income and
wealth 38. New York and London: Columbia University Press for the National Bu-
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also to tilt the balance between this awkward A and B department, people who could never
agree in the first place. Now we have the interesting case that one seventh of an ECU in fact
has already been matched by a total ECU at the university, that is one half of an ECU at the
university level and one half of an ECU at the college level. That is an interesting multiplier
indeed. It is interesting to note what is going to happen in the A and B department. Being
confronted with these constraints, and being, of course, loched into their lifetime research
program, also working on the basis of the agreements made with their chairman at the point of
their hiring, research evaluations and promotion decisions, people will take decisions so as to
make sure that they can conform to the new standards thus imposed, as these may trickle down
research money, travel stipends and extra perks.
The impact of such a policy initiative can be extremely heavy, if institutions have not been used
to similar treatment. In all likelihood, all the participant agents are acting in good faith.
VIII.
Since the policy instruments are the brain childs of those who came up with the policy goals,
there is very little use in discussing the policy instruments separate from the policy goals. The
instruments have been discussed and looked at in their various difficiencies in the preceding
paragraph. We now continue with the issue of performance and its evaluation.
IX. A Point of Theory
In trying to suggest an appropriate technique for analysing the performance of public enterpri-
ses thus described, we have to reckon with the many and different purposes governments try to
pursue with them. As the preceeding discussion may have suggested, the definition of the
purpose of a university as a public enterprises is mainly negative. It is easier to characterise
them in terms of the purposes they are explicitly not suggested to serve instead of precisely
establishing what the purposes are that they are supposed to fulfil. This may be a deplorable
situation from the point of view of economic analysis; but we cannot reject the possibility out
of hand that the apparent fuzziness of university purposes in most democratic societies is the
very reason why they occupy such a prominent and increasing role in many economies, privati-
zation programs notwithstanding. The implication for attempts at evaluating the performance
of universities is that a technique of performance analysis has to be found that can serve as an
envelope for the fuzzy purposes public entereprises in general and universities more particular-
ly are fulfilling. Instead of clearly establishing performance criteria drawn from applied welfare
economics and attributing them to public enterprises, a technique may be preferable that starts
from the public enterprise itself and attempts at an increasingly more precise picture of the
fuzzy set of objectives pursued.
The basic theoretical point of departure for this approach was introduced by Mancur Olson at
a National Bureau of Economic Research conference in 1973 devoted to the measurement of
economic and social performance. Olson's point of departure is the suggestion, that11
reau of Economic Research 1973, pp. 355-384 and 397-409.
See the interchange by Leibenstein and Stigler on X-Inefficiency in the American12
Economic Review. George J. Stigler, "The Xistence of X-Efficiency". American
Economic Review, 66, 1976, pp. 213-216. Harvey Leibenstein, "X-Inefficiency Xists:
Reply to an Xorcist'. American Economic Review, 68, 1978, pp. 203-211.
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"governments are in fact as well as by reputation usually inefficient, and that this is
mainly because they deal will collective goods and externalities." (Olson 1973, 359).
It should be emphasized from the start that Olson explicitly refers to technical (in) efficiency.
His notion of efficiency has to be seen in the context of, e.g., the literature on production
functions, and not in the sense in which it is used by members of the Chicago school such as
the late George Stigler. This choice of efficiency concepts implies that public production,12
even where its methods have been shown to be inefficient for not reaching the production
possibility frontier, may yet not be improvable in the Pareto sense because no better alternative
is known that can readily be implemented. In terms of a transactions cost approach, this implies
that public production, even where it is shown to be technically inefficient according to the
performance analysis approaches, may still be efficient because unimprovable, since the trans-
actions costs involved in this particular process of production are prohibitively high in rende-
ring the internalisation of externalities infeasible.
Which are these areas of public production Olson is referring to? His examples include: law
and order, defense, basic research, and pollution control (Olson 1973, 359), areas which form
the new primary domain of public entrprises as opposed to the past smoke stack industries.
More so than fifteen years ago when Olson made this suggestion, public enterprises today are
increasingly retreating from the production of merely private goods and thriving where they
contribute to the production of positive externalities and public goods, a contribution often
made as a by-product of traditional production. Research laboratories with spin-offs for
defense, passenger railroad to substitute for car transport and universities contributing to basic
research are all cases in point and mark public entrepreneurship to which all Western states
cling irrespective of privatization programs they may otherwise be engaged in.
The inherent inefficiency to which Olson pointed is unavoidable, because it is inherent in the
very definition of a public good. These inefficiencies are of two kinds. To the extent that no-
one can be excluded from the consumption of the good, the true preferences for the provision
of the public good are difficult to establish. Hence, in assessing the performance of public
production, we never know whether too little or too much is being produced. The second
source of inefficiency is more difficult to handle. Even where governments provide too little or
too much of a particular public good, they may do so perfectly efficiently in terms of reaching
the production possibility frontier. The condition of jointness of consumption implies that the
marginal calculus breaks down and that measuring of outputs becomes infeasible. As Olson
puts it:
"The very characteristics of a collective good that make it a kind from which non-
purchasers cannot be excluded, also make it a kind of which the output is not in the
form of divisible units that can be readily counted." (Olson, 1973, 362).
See William S. Peirce, "Bureaucratic Failure: Incremental Drift from Public Goods".13
Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University, Department of Economics, Working
Paper Nr. 32, 1977.
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Since evaluating the performance of public production requires the attribution of some values
to the output, performance analysts face a grave dilemma:
"The customer (demanding a private good, J.B.) is in a position to estimate the value
to himself of an additional supply of service from a firm because he can experiment
with different levels of purchase. His estimate of the value of the goods shows up in
the marginal revenue the firm receives. By contrast, in the case of a collective good
going simultaneously to many individuals, the individual consumer cannot take more
or less to see how that effects his wellbeing." (Olson, 1973, 363).
This second difficulty leaves us with the dilemma that the production functions for public
goods and externalities cannot be established and production cannot be evaluated in terms of
technical efficiency (Olson, 1973, 405). Since this will also be true when public enterprises
simultaneously engage in the joint production of private and public goods, a different approach
will have to be devised.
While Olsons's point is extremely important and very basic, it does not lead immediately to
ready made solutions to improve the efficiency of public sector production. His own suggesti-
ons (selective and experimental pricing and spot controls) might help on occasion, but if
systematically used would likely invite inefficient responses on the part of the public institution
thus controlled. Not surprisingly, agreement could not be reached at the NBER conference,13
and Olson's important paper seems not to have had major consequences so far. Fortunately, a
completely different strand of economic literature has developed right to the point that it can
be linked up with Olson's approach.
X.
In however way you want to turn the pages of history, European universities now look diffe-
rent from how they looked, for instance, five years ago. The European initiative has had an
impact, and we can look at the impact from different points of view, but we have to somehow
accept and comprehend that with the European Union initiatives also arrived the notion of
rating research. Now, to begin with, rating research has, of course, been with the European
research universities since the very beginning. The most visible sign of appreciation has always
been the flow of students coming to a particular professor. Interestingly enough, there is
another European Union initiative seizing just upon that issue and channeling the flow of
students to particular professors under their program control. Whether this particular program
(Erasmus/Socrates), certainly not in accordance with university constitutions, is anywhere in
compliance in Europe, is certainly beyond my expertise. Yet, it is obvious that depending on
circumstances, psychology as a field may be a very important field in one university, and
sociology in another, where there may be universities where economics is absolutely beyond
question, whereas marketing is not, there may yet be another university in which marketing is
the prime focus, and economics is of little significance. The issue in this context is how Euro-
pean policies impact on these situations, for instance policies towards research and technology
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in the European research landscape.
This scenario has been described in such an awkward way in order to show what awkward
problems need to be addressed if one wants to compare the quality of different university
institutions with respect to their output across the different Member States of the European
Union.
For starters, keep in mind that the Treaty of Maastricht has excluded the sphere of culture
from what is to be harmonized. Yet, at the same time and at the time of writing as well as
signing and ratifying the Treaty of Maastricht, one of the most popular programs ever launched
by the European Union was the Erasmus program of student exchange, now being superceded
by the Socrates program. This program was much more succesful than the, for instance,
common agricultural policy, since its excess burden is minimal, its real expenditure is equally
minimal, but its impact is very strong and somehow in tune with the ambitions of politicians in
every single Member State of the European Union. A lucky find, indeed.
In this benign context, however, students need to transfer credits. Students actually have to be
sent to roughly equivalent institutions if they are to transfer credits, and that requires that
institutions be looked at from the point of view of whether their output is comparable. Hence,
they need to assess that output in quantitative terms. Once you are at it, budgettary keys can
also be hooked onto that same assessment criterium and the program receives an additional
impulse because of the budgettary need to perform well in the assessment as provided by the
program ascessors.
How does the university with the strong marketing program and the insignificant economics
program fare, in this context, as it allies itself with an opposite partner? From the point of view
of the students, there should be a perfect match. The strong marketing student will wish to also
have exposure to strong economics and vice versa.
From the point of a allying oneselves with a view to rating, the weak departments have a
strong incentive to allying themselves with those that, although still acceptable to their stu-
dents, are certainly not stronger than they are themselves. There is, then, a run towards the
lowest common denominator of general acceptance.
Since the incentives although on the whole not very important on the margin are still strong,
our previous example showed how one ECU could generate efforts well in excess of seven
under plausible assumptions, this run for the smallest common denominator will also be
translated into university administrative decisions which, as we have seen before, are not tied
to the decisions of researchers who have to guard their reputation. The up shot of this observa-
tion is that the whole scenario holds promise of poor administrative decisions, but also of
decisions of supporting lower ranking scholars that are neither to the benefit of students nor to
the benefit of the universities to which both these scholars and the students belong.
A stunning feature of the European funding policies is the ability to create clienteles for rent
seeking games at the expense of other juristisdictions. This fairly strong point can, again, be
illustrated in a step wise procedure. Take seven countries who are joined in the European
Union, and let there be doubt about the federal institution (commission or council) on whether
there is a prerogative for a particular type of policy. Hence, a tentative voluntary program can
be launched on behalf of the Union. In order to pull this off, the initiating body will have relied
on program proposals fed into its bureaucracy by applying and supplying institutions, interest
groups for diverse ends concentrating on that particular field in question, for instance policies
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towards research and technology in the European research landscape.
Take a particular discipline that, for the sake of simplicity, has always been defined as consis-
ting of seven different fields. Let a sufficient minority of one field combine and put in for a
program that will define that particular sub-field as one of the main areas of a European
research initiative. Given the particular scenario (the one to seven multiplier scenario) sketched
out above, all of a sudden, one out of these seven fields can grow beyond proportion in some
universities, most likely the better regarded ones, and still because they are regarded due to the
common and public reputation to which all of the disciplines have contributed. At this point,
due to the matching mechanism, that one discipline grows beyond proportion in those succes-
sful faculties, and it may be very difficult for competing faculties to chose a counter strategy.
As a matter of fact, given the numbers involved, the sudden increase in funding (and conse-
quently positions) in that one particular field will lead to young scholars decisions to move
into that field, or at least close to it, so as to have a chance in future appointments. Since by
their sheer weight in due course the scholars attached to this centre of excellence will
dominate professional organizations, research councils and the like, they can, to a certain
extent, perpetuate the success.
Nothing in the description of this scenario has been said about the quality of the research
involved. What has been said is that the mechanism of the programs launched by the European
Union leads to a change in the budgettary flows in such a way that substantial shifts in acade-
mic pursuit are the likely outcome.
The way we have to look at such shifts is not immediately obvious. From a simplistic economic
point of view, the better buck buys the better article, and consequently, what the heck is the
argument about? The marginal utility argument (the better buck ...) is about private goods,
about the spending decisions of private individuals or well identified groups with well identified
preferences that can enjoy the marginal benefits of acquiring particular goods or services.
Universities, as we have learned early on in this article, are above all in the business of provi-
ding public goods and externalities, for which, as I have tried to show with Mancur Olsens
help, in the previous section, the marginal calculus can break down. Worse than breaking
down, the lack of systematically being able to employ the marginal calculus opens opportuni-
ties for rent seeking, which can have consequences for the very ability of an institution to
provide the core of public goods and externalities needed for a particular infrastructure of, for
instance, a Member State of the European Community. If we just take, for the sake of an
example, the seven chair departments postulated previously, and we think that chair F is joining
with all the other chairs F, and a sub group of these chairs F receives the EU grant, the implica-
tion is that the sub disciplines represented by chairs A, B, C, D, E, and G will lose not only
relatively to F, but also absolutely, since we had assumed the total university budget to be
given, and there was a multiplier of 1:7.
Since the matching funds for the F group come out of a generally assumed to be stable but
typically shrinking general budget, it is necessary to show by some means of documentation
why the other subject areas have to release funds to the privileged one. It will be necessary to
show that the privileged area actually, by some measure, is deserving more funds than the
others, and this excercise will somehow have to be carried out a) with a view to future initiati-
ves to receive matching grants and b) with a view to the ability of the privileged department to
perform according to the criteria to be found. Thirdly, European Union guidelines will have to
be observed carefully in order to fullfil the goal pursued under a.
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In this proposition of the task of the university administrator, the preservation of the field as it
traditionally has been taught does not figure anywhere. This could be considered an advantage
if the new way of conducting research in that particular subject area where somehow the
response of a scholarly exchange as to the merits of those subject areas, which it is not among
our assumptions of this scenario. In fact, this scenario leaves ample space for entire Member
States of the European Union to leave out entire subject areas from their curricula and research
activities, and certainly without at any point of decision consciously wishing to do so.
As a preliminary conclusion, we can note that the scenarios of European policies towards
research in science and technology have the potential to skew the decisions of identifiable
decision makers so as to obfuscate the opportunity costs of their decisions and to emphasize
sometimes small marginal benefits.
The introduction of the so-called Monnet professorships is an interesting case in point. The
guidelines for the selection of Monnet professors call for nominations, either by name or by
subject area or by both through the head of the university with the consent of all the reporting
organizational parts (college, faculty, department, supervising professor), and the apparant idea
of the whole initiative is to create a breed of young European minded professors in the schools.
This objective it may very well achieve, but the opportunity costs, again, may be very high.
Let us take a look at how such a procedure takes place in a typical Member State of the
European Union. Consider a state monopoly system of the university landscape (most Europe-
an Member States have such a system) with the consequent depressed salary levels and high
regulatory burdens.
Dynamic administrators have little chance in retaining promising young staff, and they have an
eye on keeping promising staff with an ability to network in European circles so as to attract
grants money. (this would, again, follow the 7:1 matching system as explained above.)
Obviously, in a department composed of the seven sub-disciplines A through G, the choice of a
suitable candidate will have to focus on a young person in set F, who has not yet shown
credible signs of being an achieving scholar but who has shown signs of being able to network
and create funding relationships. The first point is important. If sufficient qualities in research
and teaching as well as conceivably extension exist, this person is a hot asset and cannot be
home bidded from an international market, which the European Union provides, among others
through the Treaty of Rome, the re-enforcement of that treaty through the Treaty of Maas-
tricht and, last but certainly not least the Erasmus and Socrates programs. The successful
candidate who has been selected in the way suggested will bypass many of his competitors in
his age group who have chosen different carreer paths. This will not go unnoticed, and the
departments A to D and G will be further weakened by not being able to attract hard working
if conceivably rather less European minded future university professors. Since in most
Member States of the European Union, administrators who take the Monnet decisions are
sitting for only one or two years, they have a strong incentive to further the interests of their
own - within reason of their colleagues - and look at the future consequences, notably with
respect to the entire research landscape and to what students can now reasonably expect, with
less intensity of purview.
The Monnet program then will have produced an interesting group of people who will interact
with the traditionally appointed university professors, but the long term impact of the program
on the progress in science and technology in the European Union will be very difficult to
In my attempts to discuss these matters, I have been stunned by the lack of knowledge14
of well known university professors about the circumstances of their professional
existence. In particular, I was stunned by the fact that more is always thought to be
better than less, without due regard to whether more is coming, and why the less is
being accepted.
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assess. It may be impossible to assess, although the damage of the program may be substantial.
The main damage lies in breaking the traditional carreer patterns on which life orienting
decisions had been based, which is important in the case of researchers who tie their human
capital to their research outlook, and it is also important with respect to guaranteeing a reliable
transfer of knowledge to the next generation. Several European Union members are no longer
able to transfer the common European knowledge in my own discipline, economics, to the next
generation, as they lack, to name just the simplest instance, a commonly accessible source for
tapping the internationally common pool of (in my case: economic) knowledge.
XI.
This essay has been difficult to read because the author had to lead the reader to conclusions
that are by no means obvious, and that have not at all been discussed in the popular or acade-
mic press. Actually, the findings here presented cannot readily be translated into research
paradigms that could be conducted so as to survive, in their output, standard review procedu-
res for research to be published.
However, I submit to the reader the question: what else can we do? The problems pointed at in
this essay are by no means obvious, and they spring from a mind trained in thinking about
orders of systems, when most economists are not even trained in terms of thinking about
systems but rather in terms of processes within the systems they have learned to know since
they were high school students. The bread and butter applications of my suggestions are more
tangible than what could have been accomplished through a sociological approach, they are
also more tangible and, I think more palatable than could have been accomplished through a
post-modernist approach, and yet I remain unhappy about not being able to systemattically
have this analysis be screened by an audience that actually knows the subject The sample for14
a critical inquiry about the merits of my study would have to be a group of economically
trained university administrators. This group does exist, and I intend (with the consent of the
editor) to conduct such a survey. If one takes a world wide view, a surprisingly large number
of economists have actually ended up as university presidents. The survey would emphasize the
issue of whether my rendition of the problems European research universities face vis á vis the
current and upcoming European initiatives, is skewed, wrong headed or to the point.
Since most of the actual consequences of European Union initiatives described in this chapter
are difficult to ascertain in clear quantitatives terms, and since there are certainly no data bases
which can be readily accessed by ill-equipped students ready to finish a disseration project
within their allotted time, where the allotted time again has no bearing on the importance of the
subject, it is difficult to dispute my story. But this is deeply troubling to me, as I am one who
should like to have his story disputed if it is not correct. In this case, it is difficult to dis-sociate
the personality of the writer from the article that is being written. One way, so far the only way
- Senn, P. R., Where is Althoff? Friedrich Althoff in English: How Has He Feared,15
in: Backhaus, J. (guest editor), The Economics of Science Policy, Journal of Econo-
mic Studies, vol. 20, No. 3/4, 1993a, pp.201-261.
- Senn, P.R., What has Happened to Gustav Schmoller In English? History of
Economics Society Bulletin. 11, No.2. (Fall) 252-294. Original paper read at the
symposium Gustav von Schmoller und die Probleme von Heute, 24-27 June, 1988
in Heilbronn, Germany.
- Senn, P.R., Gustav von Schmoller in English: How has he Fared? History of
Economic Ideas. Combined Vols. I/1993. No.3 and II/1994. No.1: 267-329.
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I know, there may be others, is the approach to influence studies, Peter Senn has pioneered.15
This is one approach addressed to the question raised. It is not the only possible approach, and
it is not the last approach.
The main point of this study, that the European research university, given the shape of the
current programs of the European Union, is being weakened by the European Union, will only
be demonstrable after the readers of this essay have long passed their prime.
XII.
In this essay, I have tried to show that the European Union inititiatives towards science and
technology, ostensibly in the interest of promoting employment and growth through technolo-
gical advancement, have side effects that undermine the very purpose at which they aim. The
funding formula and the way the programs are launched undermine the ability of leading
research universities to be leading players in the international fields that is, of course, not
dominated by European Union research priorities. The only way to make the program succes-
sful is, indeed, to make it universal, which is out of the question. More specifically, we have
taken note of a number of points which are worth taking stock of at the end of this long essay.
They do not quite reveal the impact of the argument, but some preliminary statements may well
be formulated on the basis thereof.
1. At the traditional European research university, next to the publication of doctoral disserati-
ons and public examinations throughout, open competition for university positions and the
prohibition of inhouse promotions (which are known to lead to nepotism) form part of the
heritage of reputation preservation.
In no known case was there an emphasis, during the era of the traditional European research
university, on trying to organize the competitive process for resources around topics of inquiry
of themes of research, as such attemps would necessarily skew competition in terms of the
specific competitors aware of their prior advantage.
Secondly, with respect to scholarly communication we can note:
2. Only if the participating scholars and scholarly institutions are roughly endowed with the
same bundle of rights can an unstrategic process of scholarly communication take place and
continue with success.
Max Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf. In: Wissenschaft und Politik als Beruf.16
Tübingen: Mohr, Siebeck 1919, 1983 (Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, vol. 15-2).
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3. Joint financing arrangements stemming from decisions involving the European Commission
and the European Council, and the consequences thereof, can lead to serious impairment and
conceivably a break down of the scholarly community, the reliability of interchange and the
unquestionability of scholarly motives in entering into scholarly communication.
New forms of financing universities would give even former state sponsored universities
substantial room for re-learning the old game of competition.
4. This scenario is credible. In one case, it can be demonstrated that substantial funds had been
accumulated within a fairly short period of time, under fairly adverse tax legislation, and yet
being sufficient to feed an entire university (the University of Frankfurt on the Main).
With enlightened or only a little bit enlightened tax legislation, it should be possible to repeat
the experience.
5. The mechanisms of the programs launched by the European Union lead to a change in the
budgettary flows in such a way that substantial shifts in academic pursuit are the likely outco-
me.
6. The scenarios of European policies towards research in science and technology have the
potential to skew the decisions of identifiable decision makers so as to obfuscate the opportu-
nity costs of the decisions and to emphasize sometimes small marginal benefits.
7. The difficulty in forming an opinion about the relevance and significance of European
research policies lies in the impossibility of economists taking a point of view. In this sense
Max Weber has greatly helped in writing this article.16
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